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Article 3

Daubert and Its Discontents
Ronald J. Allen† and Esfand Nafisi‡
I.

INTRODUCTION*

The
law
suffers
from
serious
informational
vulnerability. The legal system has no independent body of
knowledge from which to determine rights and obligations, but
rather is dependent upon external sources—witnesses and
exhibits—to present information from which the facts will be
found.1 Parties presenting these sources of evidence, and
sometimes the sources themselves, may have mixed incentives
to present truthfully, depending upon whether the truth yields
a desirable result. The law’s solution to this problem is to
commit the task of fact finding to disinterested individuals,
either jurors or judges, who are fully aware of the foibles of
human existence. They are asked to process and rationally
deliberate upon what the parties present in order to determine
the most plausible explanation of the events being litigated.
The law largely permits parties to present whatever
relevant evidence there is and explore the veracity of that
evidence at trial. The operating assumption, and the deepest
aspiration of the legal system, is that this process will facilitate
the accurate resolution of disputes upon which the rights and
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*
We, like many others, were both inspired and provoked by the work of the
late Professor Margaret A. Berger. In the article that follows we acknowledge much of
the wisdom of her views and attempt to demonstrate where and why, in some
instances, we differ. We had hoped this article would spark a dialogue with her, which
is one of the reasons we published it in her home journal.
1
In fact, the matter is a bit more complicated, as most of the evidence is
imported to a trial by whomever the decision maker is. See generally Ronald J. Allen,
Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604-40 (1994); Ronald J.
Allen & Alicia L. Carriquiry, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence Reconsidered:
A Dialogue Between a Statistician and a Law Professor, 31 ISR. L. REV. 464 (1997).
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obligations of the parties depend. Without factually true
findings, rights are meaningless.2
The process of litigation seems to work fairly well for
the most part. The fact that very few cases reach the trial
stage3 suggests that only highly contentious disputes need be
resolved by a third-party fact finder. The reason it works well
is largely because the fact finders—jurors or judges—are
cognitively competent and properly motivated to find the facts
accurately. Mistakes can be made, but the typical issue at trial
is within the understanding of the decision makers. There are
some cases, however, that pose a challenge to the deep
aspiration of accurate dispute resolution. Some litigated
controversies require access to organized bodies of knowledge
that are not within the grasp of the intelligent layman, judge,
or juror. Radiology, oncology, metallurgy, organic chemistry,
and psychology are but a few examples. Since the development
of the legal system, our society has changed from one of largely
common knowledge, with only a few isolated bodies of
specialized knowledge, to a society abounding in specialties and
subspecialties. This increasing stratification of knowledge has
caused informational vulnerability within the law. The law
needs access to these specialized bodies of knowledge; indeed, it
needs to know them—but it does not and realistically cannot.
This dilemma explains the law’s struggle to domesticate
expert evidence: if the operating assumption is that the law
needs access to an organized body of knowledge that it cannot
assimilate, then the solution must lie in some formal criteria
that take the place of substantive knowledge. In other words,
the law must have a mechanism for evaluating the
admissibility of evidence that judges and juries do not know
enough about to evaluate for themselves.

2

Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (“The basic purpose of a
trial is the determination of truth . . . .”); see also Ronald J. Allen, Explanationism All
the Way Down, 5 EPISTEME 320, 321-22 (2008) (“All rights and obligations are
meaningless without accurate fact finding. Whether the issue is the age of adulthood,
the right to an abortion, the various powers of government, or your right to possess,
consume, and dispose of your clothes, it is the conditioning of rights and obligations on
facts that gives them substance. This is the feature that most distinguishes liberal
democracies and market economies from autocratic states and centralized economies,
and the consequences are obvious.”).
3
In 2001, only 3% of all civil cases went to trial. Thomas H. Cohen & Steven
K. Smith, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT. (Apr. 2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ctcvlc01.htm. Plaintiffs won
55% of those cases. Id.
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The Frye4 test is the paradigmatic example.5 Motivating
the Frye test is the simple but compelling assumption that
deference to knowledge can substitute for rational deliberation.
Even though the fact finder may not possess the knowledge to
decide the case, it can defer decision to someone who does, and
simply embrace that person’s conclusion as its own. Thus the
provenance of the general acceptance test is the sentiment that
“[s]cience is the only source of its own reliability.”6 What better
ground to defer to expertise—and what better guarantee of
that expertise—than proof that there is unmistakably an
organized body of knowledge, and that the evidence being
offered is generally accepted within it?
The problems with the Frye test are serious and do not
need rehashing here. In essence, they amount to a
demonstration of the limits and fragility of deference.7 We
would go further and point out that deference as a mode of
decision making flies in the face of—indeed is a reproach to—
the deep aspiration of the legal system to obtain rational
results. If it is truly the case that the fact finder does not
possess the information necessary to decide a case, then it is
logical that it also lacks the information necessary to know to
which of two competing opinions to defer. By embracing a
deferential model of decision making, the Frye test guarantees
irrational decision making.8

4

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Id. at 1014 (“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
the courts will go a long way in admitting experimental testimony deduced from a wellrecognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.”).
6
Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the
Law’s Hubris, 43 EMORY L.J. 913, 923 (1998). Milich continues,
5

Anything less than complete deference to the weight of credible scientific
opinion concerning the reliability of scientific evidence means going outside
science—to the judge or jury . . . to resolve a scientific dispute. The resulting
judgment cannot be scientific and therefore we cannot honestly speak of the
evidence as having “scientific” reliability . . . . [T]he “real” issue is whether
good scientists consider the evidence reliable at this time.
Id. at 923-24.
7
See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of
Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1141-42 (1993).
8
Jurors are left to decide which expert to believe based on the experts’
credentials and their credibility—that is, their oratorical performance.
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The United States Supreme Court’s 1993 Daubert
decision was a commendable effort to reestablish the primacy
of rationality in decision making.9 Rather than engage in a
futile and misdirected effort at finding the expert opinion to
defer to, the Supreme Court interpreted the Federal Rules of
Evidence to require that the trial judge ensure that all
evidence—not just lay evidence—be both relevant and reliable
in order to be admissible.10 However, the critical point is that
the Supreme Court’s articulation of the trial court’s duty
requires that the trial court not defer to the experts, but
instead reach a reasoned conclusion about the substance of the
testimony. In short, the trial court must inform itself about the
fields pertinent to the testimony. Daubert thus rejects the
deference model at least so far as the question of admissibility
is concerned.11
Unfortunately, once past the admission threshold,
nothing forbids the presentation of the evidence to the jury in
the tired, old, radically-subversive-to-the-goals-of-the-legalsystem, deferential fashion. The true problem with Daubert, in
other words, is that it did not go far enough; although to be fair
to the Court, it is constrained by the rules as written, which
plainly permit a deferential presentation of the evidence.12
Nonetheless, expert testimony could be treated just like any
other testimony, which means that for it to be admitted, it
must be understandable by the fact finder. To make an expert’s
testimony understandable requires not just the judge but also
the jury to be educated about the relevant matters.13 If parties
9

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Id. at 597 (“‘General acceptance’ is not a necessary precondition to the
admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of
Evidence—especially Rule 702—do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an
expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.
Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.”).
11
However, there is some ground for concern about how the trial courts will
go about their task. See generally Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision,
84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1157 (1994).
12
Rule 704 permits experts to opine on ultimate issues to be decided by the
trier of fact so long as the opinion does not state that a defendant in a criminal case
“did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of a crime
charged or of a defense thereto.” FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
13
Alvin Goldman uses two very helpful terms to distinguish statements in
experts’ discourse. Experts’ discourse involves esoteric and exoteric statements. Esoteric
statements fall within “the relevant sphere of expertise,” but have “truth-values [that]
are inaccessible” to jurors—“in terms of personal knowledge,” at least. “Exoteric
statements [fall] outside the domain of expertise” and jurors may understand them.
Alvin I. Goldman, Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?, 63 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 94 (2001). Statements are exoteric or esoteric relative to an
10
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were forced to educate the fact finder about the topics where
expert opinions are now employed, the problem of expert
evidence would largely disappear because the process of
educating the fact finder would likely reveal weaknesses or
falsities in the evidence. Daubert thus takes a hesitating step
in the right direction, and those interested in rational decisionmaking should encourage extending its application to the trial
itself.14 Cost is the primary objection to this, but it is
remarkable that cost is raised as an objection to evidence that
might actually be useful to a jury—evidence about oncology or
statistics, for example—where by contrast we force juries to
absorb vast amounts of information about the private affairs of
parties that are purely useless to them.
Notwithstanding the critical epistemological limit of
Daubert elaborated above, the case has been generally well
received by the legal system (although not as well received as
the Federal Rules of Evidence in general).15 In addition to its
epistemological limitations, other criticisms of it have been
raised, and the case has prompted at least one major proposal,
supported by the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public
Policy (“SKAPP”) and a distinguished legal scholar, Professor
Margaret A. Berger, to change tort law to avoid its effects.16
epistemic standpoint—that is, over time statements that were once esoteric may
become exoteric. On the education model of expert testimony, the aim is to convert as
much esoteric evidence as possible to exoteric information. Id.
14
The positive effect of Daubert, as well as a symptom of the cost of not
extending it, is clear in the concern, which is likely true, that judges are making
sufficiency determinations in Daubert hearings in the guise of admissibility
determinations. This is a perfectly plausible thing to do if judges think that juries will
not understand expert evidence. In that case, if the evidence is admissible but not
sufficient for a verdict, sending it to a jury risks a difficult-to-overturn mistake.
Screening the evidence for a sufficiently justified opinion to defer to, by contrast,
advances the goals of the system in this weird setting of irrational decision making.
15
As of mid-2003, nine states had adopted the full Daubert trilogy, which
includes Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and General Electric Co.
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); seven states had adopted Daubert itself but not the
other parts of the trilogy; six states had adopted Daubert and Kumho (i.e., the Daubert
standards apply to a wide range of expert testimony) but had not adopted Joiner (i.e.,
they have rejected the abuse of discretion standard for appellate review); five states
had explicitly not adopted Daubert but have determined that the Daubert factors can
be utilized (i.e., they have “endorsed” some of the Daubert principles); fifteen states
continue to rely on Frye, with the remaining states having their own standards that
are neither Daubert nor Frye. David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert
Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 351-66 (2004). Similarly, many states
have closely modeled their rules of evidence after the Federal Rules of Evidence. For a
list of states adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence in various forms, see 6 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2009).
16
See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95
AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH S59, S65 (2005) (acknowledging the Project on Scientific
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Collectively, these efforts raise important and timely questions,
which we address in this article. Although we think the critics
have highlighted critical issues and provided illuminating
analysis, we ultimately conclude that, with one notable
exception, they leave the important—and very difficult—
questions having to do with expert testimony untouched. With
respect to the notable exception, the policy prescription derived
from it is, in our opinion, misguided. Nonetheless, their
proposals help sharpen the intractable problems posed by
Daubert and the role of expert testimony in the legal system.
In this paper, we address the various critiques relating
to Daubert that have been influenced in one manner or another
by Professor Berger. We begin Part II by addressing what is
perhaps the central concern with Daubert—that judges are not
well suited for the gatekeeper function that Daubert bestows
upon them. These concerns have given rise to a number of
efforts to either eliminate Daubert or substantially alter the
judge’s gatekeeper function. More particularly, Part II
discusses scientific bias and its attendant evidentiary dangers,
and examines one scholarly proposal for dealing with such bias.
We argue that those concerns miscalculate the incentives to
create biased science. In Part III, we evaluate indirect attacks
on Daubert in the form of proposals for new liability rules that
eliminate outright the causation requirement in toxic tort
cases, and thus minimize or eliminate the need for expert
testimony to support a plaintiff’s case.
The critiques and responses to Daubert we address are
individually quite creative. But they are analogous to the
previous efforts to domesticate the problem of expert
testimony, of which Daubert itself is an example. Rather than
dealing directly with the epistemological problem expert
testimony poses, each of these efforts responds with a new set
of substantive rules of one sort or another, whether focusing on
the criteria of admissibility or modifying substantive tort law to
achieve a purportedly better outcome in the shadow of the
difficulties of expert testimony. Like previous efforts to deal
with expert testimony, these proposals will have undesirable
consequences—often hurting those the proposals are intended
to help. To us this confirms that the standard of admissibility
Knowledge and Public Policy for its support). Berger is also heavily cited in at least one
SKAPP manuscript. See PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND PUB. POLICY,
DAUBERT: THE MOST INFLUENTIAL SUPREME COURT RULING YOU’VE NEVER HEARD OF
(2003) [hereinafter SKAPP, DAUBERT].
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for expert testimony should turn on epistemological concerns
rather than on political or moral concerns. By ignoring the
epistemological concerns, these proposals may redistribute
winners and losers in litigation, but will not advance the
overall objectives of the legal system.
Finally, in Part IV, we briefly discuss SKAPP’s study of
Daubert’s effects in the Delaware courts. That study, though
not conclusive, suggests that Daubert has not led to the
nightmare scenarios that many imagined. Indeed, its impact
has been minimal. After evaluating the proposals for new
liability rules and discussing the empirical indication that
Daubert may not have the negative effects that scholars
imagine, we conclude that the solution to the problem of expert
testimony lies in making it conform to the normal criteria of
admissible evidence: that it is capable of being understood by
the fact finder.
II.

CRITIQUES OF DAUBERT

A.

The Foundational Fear: Biased Judges and Biased Science

It is obvious and somewhat troubling that attorneys will
select the most credible expert whose opinions about the
litigated matter align with the litigants’ objectives. It is less
obvious but perhaps even more troubling that, as Professor
Bernstein discusses in a recent article,17 experts will bend,
consciously and unconsciously, to the objectives of the litigants.
Conscious bias arises when experts adapt their opinions to the
needs of the attorney who hires them.18 Unconscious bias is the
“‘natural bias to do something serviceable for those who employ
you and adequately remunerate you.’”19 Selection bias means

17

David Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial)
Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 454-55 (2008).
18
Id. Bernstein argues that “hired gun” expert witnesses are widely recognized as
a serious problem. According to Judge Jack Weinstein, “An expert can be found to testify to
the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how frivolous . . . .” Jack B. Weinstein,
Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 482 (1986). Hired guns have, for
example, been a major problem in asbestosis and silica litigation. See, e.g., In re Silica Prods.
Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (detailing how experts skewed their
testimony to benefit plaintiffs); see also David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of
Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 11, 12 (2003) (discussing plaintiffs’ experts who find
evidence of injury from asbestos exposure in almost every individual presented to them,
even when the exposure was extremely limited).
19
Bernstein, supra note 17, at 455-56 (quoting Abinger v. Ashton, 17 L.R. Eq.
358, 374 (Ch. 1873)).
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that experts selected for trial will be chosen to “represent the
perspective the attorney wants to present at trial.”20
Given these potential biases, Judge Alex Kozinski may
have gotten it right in the remand of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,21 when he warned that science done for
the purpose of litigation is more prone to bias.22 Judge Kozinski
expressed concerns that scientists retained for trial would
deviate from the norm of disinterested inquiry. This
disinterested inquiry is what makes scientific evidence so
valuable in courtrooms: “[T]estimony proffered by an expert . . .
based directly on legitimate, preexisting research unrelated to
the litigation provides the most persuasive basis for concluding
that the opinions [a scientist] expresses were ‘derived by the
scientific method.’”23 The concern, expressed in a roundabout
way, is that scientists conducting litigation-driven science are
more likely to succumb to biases, leading them to commit fraud
or to fudge the data. In other words, “when an expert prepares
reports and findings before being hired as a witness, that
record will limit the degree to which he can tailor his testimony
to serve a party’s interests.”24 Judge Kozinski’s central concern,
to borrow a helpful dichotomy from Professor Susan Haack, is
that scientists retained for litigation will focus on advocacy
rather than disinterested inquiry.25
20

Id. at 456. Given the deference model of expert testimony encouraged by
Daubert and judges, it is quite likely that selection bias means that attorneys shop for
experts who will not only testify favorably, but will do so with a convincing demeanor.
See id. at 456-57. The epistemic opacity of expert testimony on the deference model
means that jurors frequently must judge expert witnesses not on their substantive
testimony, but on their demeanor and credentials. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 13, at
96 n.13, 97. One of the sources of evidence that non-experts may draw on to judge
between competing experts is the formal credentials earned by the experts. See Scott
Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535,
1538 (1998). Of the array of reasoning mechanisms available to non-experts to choose
among expert witnesses, the two most likely to be relied on are (1) “the expert’s
demeanor, either as he appears before the non-expert in person or as indicated by . . .
the tone and authoritative style of written submissions to the court,” and (2) the
expert’s credentials. Id. at 1616.
21
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
22
Id. at 1317.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Susan Haack, What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay in
Legal Epistemology, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1053, 1070 (2008) (“Inquiry,
investigation—the professional business of scientists, historians, legal and literary
scholars, investigative journalists, and so forth—is a matter of trying to discover the
answer to some question: who committed the crime, what caused the cancer or made it
advance so quickly, where did the money go, etc.? Advocacy, by contrast—the
professional business of lobbyists, attorneys, and so on—is a matter of trying to
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Although much has been made of Kozinski’s concerns
about litigation-driven science, our own brief and informal
survey revealed that judges who invoke this concern do so only
when scientific evidence fails to meet most or all of the other
Daubert factors.26 Indeed, it appears that judges only invoke the
litigation-driven nature of scientific work where none of the
Daubert factors is satisfied—that is, the expert’s study has not
been peer reviewed, has no error rate, has no general
acceptance, and so forth—and then the judges only invoke it in
a boilerplate fashion.27 In effect, Judge Kozinski’s additional
Daubert factor is used as something of a pejorative term to
describe evidence that has met none of the Daubert factors.
And we think this is perfectly appropriate.
1. Proposed Liberalized Standards
In a recent SKAPP-sponsored article, Leslie I. Boden
and David Ozonoff argue convincingly that there is good reason
to be concerned about litigation-driven science conducted by
defendants prior to—and in expectation of—a lawsuit.28 This is
because certain corporations always act with an eye to
persuade an audience of the truth of some proposition: that my client didn’t do it, that
it was work-related PCB exposure that promoted the tumor, that the stolen money has
been hidden in a numbered account in the Cayman Islands, etc.”).
26
These cases are anecdotally interesting, as the list is nowhere near
comprehensive. In Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 209, 214 (D. Nev. 1996), the
court mentions the litigation-driven nature of a doctor’s work, but then bars the
evidence based on the damning fact that the doctor never examined the plaintiff’s brain
shunt, had no literature to support his claims, and was arguing claims that are neither
supported in the scientific community nor subjected to peer review. In Awad v. Merck
& Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 301, 304, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the court ultimately permitted
testimony despite the fact that “[the expert’s] opinion rests primarily on articles
written by others, which he analyzed only because of this case . . . . [T]he theory on
which he bases his conclusions—that the RA 27/3 vaccine causes chronic joint
problems—has been subjected to peer review, and its degree of acceptance in the
scientific community can be examined.” In Cerna v. South Florida Bioavailability
Clinic, 815 So. 2d 652, 654-56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), the court noted that the
expert’s testimony was prepared specifically for trial, but rejected it after a lengthy
analysis because “his methodologies are not generally accepted in the scientific
community.” In Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 433, 435-36
(6th Cir. 2007), the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant because the
plaintiff’s expert had not tested his hypothesis (which itself did not enjoy general
acceptance during the relevant time period) and because the “‘quintessential expert for
hire’” did not show “some objective proof—such as the expert’s extensive familiarity
with the particular type of machine in question . . . —supporting the reliability of the
expert’s testimony.”
27
It bears mentioning that such evidence would likely be inadmissible even
absent Judge Kozinski’s Daubert factor.
28
Leslie I. Boden & David Ozonoff, Litigation-Generated Science: Why
Should We Care?, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 117 (2008).
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litigation.29 Accordingly, Boden and Ozonoff argue, there is no
reason to think that litigation-generated science (“LGS1”) is
any less reliable than science generated in expectation of
litigation (“LGS2”).30 Thus, Kozinski’s concern about bias was
correct, but it did not go far enough. Boden and Ozonoff suggest
liberalizing the standards for the admissibility of scientific
evidence, relying on cross-examination to winnow out the
unreliable science.31
There are, to be sure, powerful incentives in place for
biased science.32 LGS1, which plaintiffs frequently rely upon to
prove causation in toxic tort cases, potentially creates in the
scientist “a financial conflict of interest.”33 The concern is that
the conflict of interest “will lead the researcher to conduct the
study or interpret the results in a manner designed to suit that
party,”34 but there are equally strong financial and social
incentives for scientists to fudge LGS2.35 The ability to
influence scientific experiments allows corporations to use
biased LGS2 to satisfy the safety concerns of purchasers, and it
proves useful if the product’s safety should be litigated.36 Boden
and Ozonoff assert that a cluster of studies show “a covert
litigation-driven relationship between LGS2 and the general
literature that is currently less likely to be subjected to the
same additional scrutiny routinely applied to science that is
29
30
31
32

Id. at 118.
Id.
Id. at 119.
The pressure on corporate scientists is immense:

Approval of new drugs can literally add billions of dollars to annual profits.
To obtain approval, companies must demonstrate safety and efficacy. Failure
to show either can lead the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
delay or ultimately deny approval. Thus, the companies funding drug trials
obviously need and want results that support their applications. This
research is begun well in advance of any possible liability litigation and not
explicitly to support a position in a lawsuit. But such research purporting to
demonstrate safety could be used later by companies defending
themselves . . . . Scientists and companies are aware of this aspect of safety
research conducted before a product hits the market.
Id. at 118.
33

Id.
Id.
35
Id. One study, for instance, shows that “safety and efficacy studies funded
by pharmaceutical companies” tend to exhibit “conclusions more favorable to the
companies funding them.” Id. Another study shows that “biomedical industry
relationships are associated with a delay in reporting research results.” Id. (citation
omitted). The authors argue that such delays violate scientific norms when they are
caused by trade secret concerns. Id.
36
Id.
34
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explicitly case specific.”37 Because plaintiffs do not have the
same ability to generate LGS2 as potential defendants, the
authors argue that judges, like Kozinski, who treat LGS1 as
much more suspect than LGS2, effectively “place[][their]
thumb[s] on the scales of justice.”38
Unlike some of the other critiques of Daubert that
endorse eliminating judges’ gatekeeper function outright, Boden
and Ozonoff endorse substantially lowering the gate of
admissibility. Specifically, they endorse “expanded discovery and
greater latitude for cross-examination by the parties. . . .
[p]articularly . . . where company motives that appear unrelated
to the case at hand may be highly pertinent.”39 They buttress
their arguments for expanded discovery by arguing that peer
review is overrated and that cross-examination in many cases
will do at least as good a job as peer review of winnowing out
bad science.40
Boden and Ozonoff disagree with recent work that has
taken a more hopeful view of peer review’s potential to winnow
scientific wheat from chaff.41 Peer review, they argue, is not the
remedy for Judge Kozinski’s concerns, and even if it were, peer
review may take too long to meet the demands of litigation.42
Moreover, the questions central to a legal case may be too
narrow for peer-review publication, and the methodologies
utilized in LGS1 may be too cutting edge to satisfy the “inside
the box” thinking that peer review rewards.43 Daubert, the
37

Id. at 119.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 119-20. They cite research showing that peer reviewers frequently
disagree about whether to support papers. Id. at 119 (citing Peter M. Rothwell &
Christopher N. Martyn, Reproducibility of Peer Review in Clinical Neuroscience: Is
Agreement Between Reviewers any Greater than Would Be Expected by Chance Alone?,
123 BRAIN 1964 (2000)). They also show evidence that “poorly designed and analyzed
studies can easily receive favorable reviews.” Id. (citing Gregory D. Curfman, Stephen
Morrissey & Jeffrey M. Drazen, Expression of Concern Reaffirmed, 354 NEW ENGL. J.
MED. 1193 (2006); Richard Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed Process at the Heart of
Science and Journals, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 178 (2006)). Additionally, they argue
that published articles receive “only the most cursory peer review.” Id. at 119-20 (citing
S. Jasanoff, Representation and Re-representation in Litigation Science, 116 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. 123 (2008)). “[S]cientists opt for study designs, do analyses, and
interpret results in ways that bias conclusions one way or another . . . . Peer review . . .
is unlikely to detect any but the most blatant fraud or scientific misconduct.” Id. at 120.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. As examples of “outside of the box” thinking, the authors cite articles in
economics that had great difficulty in getting published but that eventually were awarded
the Nobel Prize. See, e.g., Joshua S. Gans & George B. Shepherd, How Are the Mighty
Fallen: Rejected Classic Articles by Leading Economists, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 165 (1994).
38
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authors point out, recognizes these problems: “‘[I]n some
instances, well-grounded but innovative theories will not have
been published . . . . Some propositions, moreover, are too
particular, too new or of too limited interest to be published.’”44
The protections of peer review, they argue, can “‘fall apart if
lawyers and litigation experts invade the realm of scientific
research and manipulate the medical and scientific publication
system to achieve their litigation ends.’”45
Boden and Ozonoff believe that jurors should get to
decide what kind of science is unreliable by letting all evidence
in and letting the process of cross-examination reveal which
science is unworthy. Cross-examination, in the authors’ view, is
more stringent than almost all peer review processes because
lawyers, unlike peer reviewers, are properly incentivized to get
to the truth; therefore, cross-examination may actually be more
useful than peer review for uncovering flawed or biased
research.46 Lawyers preparing for cross-examination are
typically aided by consultants and go over the studies in
exacting detail, which could potentially bring to light any flaws
in a particular study. Cross-examination’s adversarial nature
thus offers the potential of revealing errors that peer review
would not detect.47 They conclude that there are no strong
reasons to treat the conflicts of interest that LGS1 creates any
differently from the conflicts of interest that LGS2 creates:
“Drawing a bright line at the moment litigation begins may be
44

Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 28, at 120 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993)).
45
Id. at 120 (quoting William L. Anderson, Barry M. Parsons & Drummond
Rennie, Daubert’s Backwash: Litigation-Generated Science, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
619 (2001)).
46
Id. Boden and Ozonoff suggest a greater degree of disclosure by scientists
as required by the manuscript requirements of the International Committee for
Medical Journal Editors:
Authors submitting articles to [medical] journals must disclose all
relationships that might involve the appearance of a conflict of interest, and
they must disclose study funding . . . . Articles submitted to the journals
should be accompanied by signed statements by authors stating that they
control the data, analysis, the writing of reports, and submission for
publication. Authors must describe any involvement of sponsors in any of
these aspects of the study.
Id. at 121. It seems like these questions would be answered right away on crossexamination. However, disclosure is not a panacea, the authors argue, as “[s]ponsors
with control over publication can decide which studies to submit, possibly choosing
preferentially to submit favorable studies and thus biasing the overall literature on
safety or efficacy.” Id. (citations omitted).
47
Id. at 120.
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convenient for the court, but it does not serve the interests of
justice.”48
Boden and Ozonoff’s prescription to lower standards of
admissibility for scientific evidence is premised on the
conventional notion that errors at trial should be distributed
fairly, as well as the assumption that a fair distribution of
errors is not possible if defendants are allowed to introduce
more biased science than plaintiffs. The authors propose to
solve this potential inequality by allowing judges to admit more
of plaintiffs’ error-inducing biased science into the courtroom,
thus ensuring a parity of errors.
We have elaborated on Boden and Ozonoff’s arguments
about pre-litigation science because we think there is a critical
element of truth in the assertion that LGS2 is susceptible to
the same sorts of conflicts of interest and biases as LGS1.
Thus, it is by no means impossible that the Kozinski position
biases the trial process unfairly against plaintiffs, and that as a
result, errors at trial may be inappropriately skewed against
plaintiffs. Curiously, however, the authors neglect the point
that defendants also commission LGS1 and that plaintiffs also
commission LGS2.49 Boden and Ozonoff’s failure to account for
these realities, particularly the latter, diminishes the force of
their arguments. Recent events demonstrate that our concerns
about Boden and Ozonoff’s oversights are more than merely
hypothetical.
2. The Problem with Relaxed Standards: The MMR
Vaccine Example
The link between the measles, mumps, and rubella
(“MMR”) vaccination and autism has been a major source of
concern for years now. The concern was that trace amounts of
mercury in childhood vaccines were causing autism in very
young children. Consequently, many children were not given
life-saving vaccines due to parental omission bias,50 and the
48

Id. at 121.
Indeed, the point is neglected that massive errors against defendants are
also made by the system. Interestingly, SKAPP’s very existence is a consequence of one
of those errors. SKAPP is funded by the Silicone Implants Products Liability Litigation
which was, by most lights, wrongly decided for the plaintiffs. See, e.g., David E.
Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457 (1999) (reviewing MARCIA
ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE
BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996)).
50
“[O]mission bias is manifested when a more harmful act of omission is
preferred to a less harmful act of commission.” Hal Arkes, The Psychology of Patient
49
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“failure to vaccinate . . . caused many preventable deaths and
avoidable hospitalizations from measles, whooping cough,
diphtheria, flu, hepatitis and meningitis.”51 In a pattern
evincing the Benedictin scare leading to the Daubert lawsuit,52
public concern about the autism link led to the vaccine
thimerosal being pulled off the market, and the initiation of
more than 4800 lawsuits.53 Despite reports by pediatricians
that vaccines did not cause autism, and support from American
pediatricians for the World Health Organization’s decision to
continue vaccinating children with thimerosal, the scare
campaign carried out in the media was thoroughgoing and,
evidently, good for ratings, as there was even a fictional
television program about a law suit against a pharmaceutical
manufacturer that created a substance similar to thimerosal.54
Much of the vaccine scare can be traced back to a 1998
study by the English doctor Andrew Wakefield. In his study,
published in the prestigious Lancet medical journal, Dr.
Wakefield reported that eight out of twelve families in his
clinic who had given the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine
to their children began to see signs of autism within just days
of their children receiving the jab.55 Dr. Wakefield’s report led
to a staggering decrease in vaccinations in England, with rates
of inoculation falling from 92% to below 80%.56 At the time of
this writing, there are 1348 cases of measles in England and
Wales, compared to 56 in 1998.57 Two children have died of the

Decision Making: The Omission Bias, in INTERACTIVE TEXTBOOK ON CLINICAL SYMPTOM
RESEARCH, http://symptomresearch.nih.gov/chapter_4/sec2/chas2pg1.htm (last visited
Oct. 28, 2010).
51
Caplan on Vaccines and Autism, THE EDITORS’ BLOG, AM. J. OF BIOETHICS
(Feb. 6, 2007), http://blog.bioethics.net/2007/02/caplan-on-vaccines-and-autism.html.
52
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
53
Ed Silverman, Long Shot? Autism and Vaccines Trial Begins, PHARMALOT
(May 12, 2008, 9:11 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/05/long-shot-autism-andvaccines-trial-begins.
54
Molly McDonough, Pediatric Group Releases Mercury-Autism Study,
Condemns New Lawyer Drama, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 30, 2008, 7:15 PM), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/pediatric_group_releases_mercury_autism_study_condem
ns_new_lawyer_drama/.
55
Andrew Deer, MMR Doctor Andrew Wakefield Fixed Data on Autism,
SUNDAY TIMES (Feb. 8, 2009), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/
article5683671.ece.
56
Id.
57
Id.
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disease.58 It has since become clear that Wakefield drastically
misreported the results of his study:59
The patients who were “enrolled” in his study were actually not just
random children who appeared on the doorstep of Royal Free
Hospital but were clients of an attorney working against a vaccine
company alleging that vaccines caused autism. Most already know
that the children already had autism when they came into the study,
but what was news to me at least was that Wakefield had received
55,000 pounds from something called Britain’s Legal Aid Board in
the previous year (big money if you are a graduate student) which
supported research related to lawsuits.60

Tellingly, the Lancet recently retracted Dr. Wakefield’s
article.61 The General Medical Council ruled that Dr. Wakefield
evinced a “callous disregard” for children’s welfare and abused
his station.62
Boden and Ozonoff’s concerns about incentives to fudge
science are well-founded and worthy of consideration. But their
proposal for relaxed standards of admissibility does not account
for the possibility that biased science is conducted on behalf of
potential plaintiffs, as the Wakefield example demonstrates. If
both defendants and plaintiffs have powerful incentives to
manipulate scientific research, relaxing the standards of
admissibility will not level the playing field, as Boden and
Ozonoff hope; it will only increase the risk of errors.
Given the attendant dangers of errors in juridical
decision making based on false or misleading scientific
58

Id.
The Sunday Times investigation in coordination with the General Medical
Council (GMC):
59

reveal[ed] that: In most of the 12 cases, the children’s ailments as described
in The Lancet were different from their hospital and GP records. Although
the research paper claimed that problems came on within days of the jab, in
only one case did medical records suggest this was true, and in many of the
cases medical concerns had been raised before the children were vaccinated.
Hospital pathologists, looking for inflammatory bowel disease, reported in the
majority of cases that the gut was normal. This was then reviewed and the
Lancet paper showed them as abnormal.
Id.
60

Summer Johnson, The Wakefield Scandal Thickens…, BIOETHICS BLOG (Feb.
23, 2009), http://blog.bioethics.net/2009/02/the-wakefield-scandal-thickens.
61
Madison Park, Medical Journal Retracts Study Linking Autism to Vaccine,
CNN HEALTH (Feb. 2, 2010, 1:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/02/02/lancet.
retraction.autism/index.html?hpt=T2.
62
Thomas Moore, MMR Row Doctor Hits Back at Conduct Claims, SKY NEWS
ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2010, 5:04 PM), http://news.sky.com/skynews/ (search “MMR Row
Doctor Hits Back at Conduct Claims”; then follow hyperlink to article).
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evidence, and the capacity of both sides to litigation to produce
it, Boden and Ozonoff’s suggestion for even laxer standards of
admissibility is misguided. Ensuring a parity of errors, as the
authors suggest, might provide fairness, but will certainly come
at the cost of accuracy in fact finding. The suggestion is both
unacceptable and unnecessary. It is unacceptable given the
Supreme Court’s supposition that “[t]he basic purpose of a trial
is the determination of truth.”63 It is unnecessary because the
solution to the problems of endemic bias in LGS1 and LGS2 is
not to sacrifice accuracy to attain fairness, but to attain
fairness by increasing accuracy. Potentially error-inducing
variables in all scientific enterprises should be examined fully
by the trial judges, and research efforts that do not measure up
should be excluded whenever they are brought to light. This is
not a radical idea at all—it is what Daubert demands.
The genius of Daubert is that it commands that the trial
judge take all possibilities of bias into account. Of course, if
research generated in litigation turns out to be more
systematically biased than other forms, then it should follow,
and should follow uncontroversially, that such research should
also be more frequently excluded. Boden and Ozonoff have
provided an admirable service by highlighting the potential
biasing pressures in LGS2, but what follows from this is that
all scientific expert testimony should run the same gamut of
admissibility, not that errors at trial should be proliferated out
of a misguided sense of fairness.64
B.

Bias in Action: The Unfair and Unconstitutional
Application of Daubert

SKAPP and those associated with it criticize Daubert
from a number of other angles and call for a variety of reforms.
SKAPP argues that Daubert may violate the Seventh
Amendment, or at least should be construed to do so, and that
judges routinely misinterpret scientific evidence in pretrial
Daubert hearings in ways that are consistently harmful to

63

Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
In a system without transaction costs, a policy of letting all evidence in
that the parties wished to adduce might be sensible. Patient exploration of “junk”
produced by the other side would expose it for what it is. Things change in a system
with transaction costs, especially, as in the United States, where the parties do not
bear the true cost of their activities. In that system, an exclusionary approach may
achieve better overall outcomes.
64
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plaintiffs in toxic tort cases.65 An important example is the
exclusion of “mosaic evidence,” which entails relying on shards
of otherwise inadmissible evidence in order to create a picture
of causation.66
SKAPP grounds its arguments against Daubert in the
Seventh Amendment, which it interprets as imparting a right
for a plaintiff to tell his or her story in court, regardless of the
evidentiary merit.67 According to this view, Daubert hearings
raise serious constitutional issues by denying plaintiffs that
right.68 According to Professor Berger, the Seventh Amendment,
which assures the right to a jury trial,69 “‘could be read as not
just entitling a litigant to a jury verdict, but more broadly to a
jury trial when experts in different disciplines disagree.’”70
Professor Berger argues that point:
Even if a plaintiff’s verdict were ultimately set aside as not based on
sufficient evidence of causation, a public trial means the plaintiff
gets to tell his or her story and it also means that wrongdoing on the
part of defendants can be exposed. Even when causation cannot be
proved, that does not necessarily mean that defendants did not act in
a reprehensible manner in exposing the public to risk. For example,
problems often develop with drugs long after they have been
approved for market. Jury trials could reveal whether corporations
knowingly kept drugs or products on the market after it became
clear that problems existed. If such a case ends with a Daubert
hearing, none of this will ever become public.71

The difficulty here is obvious. The Seventh Amendment
has never been construed as containing the right to use trials
as a form of investigative reporting independent of the validity
of the underlying legal claims.72 Professor Berger does not
seriously argue to the contrary. Rather, she argues that it
should be so construed, but in doing so neglects the proposal’s
problems of costs and increased chance of erroneous (and
65

SKAPP, DAUBERT, supra note 16, at 7-8.
See id.
67
Id. at 8.
68
Id.
69
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
70
SKAPP, DAUBERT, supra note 16, at 8 (citing Interview by SKAPP with
Margaret Berger, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (May 15-June 6, 2003)).
71
Id.
72
As an initial matter, the Seventh Amendment has not been held
“incorporated” in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Thus, the
Constitution does not assure a right to jury trial in state court proceedings.
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Walker v. Sauvinet,
92 U.S. 90 (1875).
66
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difficult to rectify) verdicts. Moreover, it is entirely unclear
what benefit might result. If “corporations”—it is unclear to us
why corporations are the focus, but we adopt her focus for the
discussion herein—behaved “reprehensibl[y]” and “knowingly
kept drugs and products on the market after it became clear
that problems existed,” it is difficult to imagine why there
would not be a plethora of deserving plaintiffs willing to let the
plaintiffs’ bar bring a cause of action.73
A more troubling concern that SKAPP raises has to do
with the frequency with which judges bar “mosaic evidence.”
Mosaic evidence is, as the name suggests, a composite
evidentiary image made up of shards of evidence “from sources
that are frequently excluded when used to prove causation—
such as anecdotal evidence, animal studies, chemical structure
analysis, in vitro studies, and preliminary epidemiological
studies.”74 SKAPP argues that the cumulative impact of mosaic
evidence is ignored by judges who weigh each piece of evidence
individually.75 SKAPP argues that by barring mosaic evidence,
judges bar evidence that is commonly relied on in the scientific
community.
But the criticism misses the significance of the differing
institutional context. In the scientific community, mosaic
evidence is used as a brake against introducing potentially
harmful products into the public, whereas in the legal context
it is used as an engine of liability. So, for instance, it may take
only the slightest hint that something is harmful for it not to be
introduced into the public, but liability for products that have
been approved by the FDA and undergone thorough testing
should require more than a slight hint of risk.
The Bendectin case is a good example. As Professor
Berger and products liability scholar Aaron Twerski tell it,
there were many such hints of risk at the time of litigation, but
it is now generally accepted that those slight hints were
statistical aberrations or the results of poorly conducted
studies.76 Bendectin is still prescribed in many places in the
world, including Europe, is endorsed by the World Health
Organization as safe, and has been vindicated by meta73

SKAPP, DAUBERT, supra note 16, at 8.
David E. Bernstein, Learning the Wrong Lessons from “An American
Tragedy”: A Critique of the Berger-Twerski Informed Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1961, 1971-72 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
75
SKAPP, DAUBERT, supra note 16, at 8.
76
Bernstein, supra note 74, at 1964-67.
74
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analyses and the support of a number of epidemiological
studies.77 Given the weight of evidence in favor of Bendectin’s
safety, it seems peculiar to argue for mosaic evidence from a
case in which it would have plainly been misleading.
The final SKAPP critique we address concerns the
chilling effects of Daubert on plaintiffs. The costs of Daubert
hearings, SKAPP argues, chill plaintiffs from bringing suits
because jury awards often barely cover the costs of Daubert
hearings.78 This argument overestimates the frequency of
Daubert hearings79 and miscalculates their costs. The
miscalculation is because SKAPP considers only the chilling
effect of Daubert hearings on plaintiffs, and ignores the effect of
high costs on defendants.80 Costly Daubert hearings may deter
plaintiffs from bringing suit, but they also provide a powerful
incentive for defendants to settle.
III.

CAUSATION-FREE THEORIES OF TORT

We now turn directly to the work of Professor Margaret
A. Berger, a distinguished evidence scholar who has made
many significant contributions to the field of evidence,
particularly scientific evidence.81 For a little over a decade,
Professor Berger has argued for eliminating the causation
77

See, e.g., P.M. McKeigue et al., Bendectin and Birth Defects: A Meta-Analysis
of the Epidemiologic Studies, 50 TERATOLOGY 27 (1994); Bruce Jancin, Do-It-Yourself
Bendectin Advocated for Nausea, OB/GYN NEWS (Oct. 1, 2002), http://findarticles.
com/p/articles/mi_m0CYD/is_19_37/ai_92938826 (“Thirty epidemiologic studies have
concluded that Bendectin was safe for use in pregnancy[.] The FDA, World Health
Organization, and March of Dimes have exonerated the drug. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention hasn’t found any reduction in birth defects nationally since
Bendectin was pulled from the market.”).
78
SKAPP, DAUBERT, supra note 16, at 12.
79
See NICOLE L. WATERS & JESSICA P. HODGE, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, THE EFFECTS OF THE DAUBERT TRILOGY IN DELAWARE SUPERIOR COURT 21
(2005) (finding that in Delaware Daubert hearings were isolated to a small number of
important and complex cases).
80
Defendants too must retain experts to testify at Daubert hearings.
Defendants must also contribute to costs associated with the hearing. See, e.g., Thomas
G. Gutheil & Harold J. Bursztajn, Attorney Abuses of Daubert Hearings: Junk Science,
Junk Law, or Just Plain Obstruction?, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 150, 152 (2005).
81
See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Laboratory Error Seen Through the Lens of
Science and Policy, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (1997); Margaret A. Berger, Procedural
Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345 (1994); Margaret A.
Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 245
(1986); Margaret A. Berger, Introduction, Science for Judges, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2003);
Margaret A. Berger, Introduction, Science for Judges II, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 485 (2004);
Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting The Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of
The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2001).
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requirement in toxic torts contexts, which would in turn largely
eliminate the debate over scientific evidence in a large run of
tort cases by making such evidence unnecessary for a plaintiff’s
case. This would accomplish indirectly what the direct attacks
on limited admissibility of scientific evidence attempt to
achieve. We address her individual efforts and trace their
evolution in her collaborative work with products liability
scholar Aaron D. Twerski.
A.

Professor Berger’s Causation-Free Theory

Professor Berger proposes a new theory of toxic torts
that she rightly calls “a new theory of justice.”82 Professor
Berger hopes to prevent immoral corporate behavior by
imposing liability on corporations that fail “to develop and
disclose information that is needed to assess serious latent
risk[]” in toxic substances.83 To accomplish this end, Berger
proposes shifting the burden of persuasion on the issue of
causation such that defendants in toxic tort cases must prove
that they did not cause the plaintiff’s injury.84 Under this
theory, a plaintiff need only show that the defendant
corporation failed to keep itself “reasonably informed about the
risks of its products.”85 Successful plaintiffs under Berger’s
theory may receive only a fraction of compensatory damages
(possibly through an administrative compensation fund)
because they have not borne the burden of proving the
defendant caused their physical injury.86 The damage award is
largely punitive in nature, ignoring as it does causation, and
focusing instead on wrongdoing.

82

Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New
Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2117 (1997).
83
Id.
84
Id. at 2144-45. Similarly, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the
drug was only partly responsible for the plaintiff’s injury, thereby mitigating damages. Id.
85
Id. at 2134.
86
Id. (“Regardless of whether an administrative compensation scheme is in
effect, plaintiffs might not be entitled to a full measure of traditional damages under
this new tort. In exchange for relieving plaintiffs of having to prove general causation,
a possible fair trade-off might be to release defendants from having to pay for plaintiffs’
pain and suffering, or to provide for some form of damage scheduling. This is one of the
many difficult issues that courts would have to resolve. Punitive damages should not
be available as they already have been factored into the recovery—liability has been
imposed because of defendants’ egregious indifference to ascertaining risk, a
component that under traditional tort theory does not support liability in the absence
of causation.”).
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Berger’s theory was born of a concern that, in a postDaubert world, plaintiffs frequently cannot prove causation due
to scientific uncertainty about the dangers of a particular
substance.87 In toxic tort cases, “[t]he causation model is blind
to the realities of scientific uncertainty.”88 Injured plaintiffs are
losing cases they should win, Professor Berger argues, because
of the difficulties that attend proving causation under
Scientific
uncertainty
allows
unscrupulous
Daubert.89
pharmaceutical manufacturers to keep potentially unsafe
drugs on the market. Professor Berger’s charge is that
manufacturers not only predict when they will be able to avoid
liability despite having inadequately researched and disclosed
the long term risks of their chemicals, but also use these
predictions to market unsafe drugs.90
Professor Berger was not being immodest when she
referred to her theory as a new theory of justice: a causationfree tort that places the burden of proving noncausation on the
defendant and awards injured plaintiffs a portion of
compensatory damages through an administrative fund is
substantively, structurally, and procedurally a significant
departure from current tort practice. This novel theory arose
out of two concerns. First, Professor Berger argues that tort
law’s causation requirement inadequately incentivizes
responsible corporate behavior.91 Berger’s second concern is
that the causation model is inconsistent with the “corrective
justice rationale that liability is linked to moral
responsibility.”92 This is because “causation is often fortuitous
and thus morally arbitrary. To erect sharp disparities of
treatment on such a foundation violates the requirement of
equal treatment implied by the conception of equal dignity and
respect.”93

87

Id. at 2123.
Id. at 2117.
89
See id. at 2130-34.
90
Id. at 2136-40.
91
Id. at 2119.
92
Id. (“[E]liminating causation furthers tort law’s corrective justice rationale
that liability is linked to moral responsibility.”). Professor Berger argues that certain
features of toxic tort cases “mesh poorly with the corrective justice notion that
individuals should be liable only for morally irresponsible choices.” Id. at 2133.
93
Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation, Compensation and Moral Responsibility,
in PHILISOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 347, 349 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
88
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Professor Berger’s proposal invites appraisal at both the
philosophical and practical levels. We begin with the
philosophical.
1. Philosophical Difficulties
Professor Berger justifies her theory in part on
corrective justice grounds.94 Specifically, she relies on the work
of Christopher Schroeder, who argues that corrective justice
demands the abandonment of tort law’s cause-in-fact
requirement because it is “too slender a reed” upon which to
rest liability.95 Schroeder’s theory of corrective justice, which
predicates liability on moral responsibility, is not well accepted
among tort theorists.96 But even Schroeder agrees that theories
of corrective justice must adhere to certain foundational
principles,97 one of which is the Kantian requirement that
corrective justice “defend[] liability on noninstrumental
grounds, freed from consideration of purposes external to the
tort process, such as distributive justice.”98 Berger’s theory
violates this requirement by justifying liability on instrumental
grounds, as it aims to incentivize corporations to “obtain[]
94

Berger, supra note 82, at 2119. (“[E]liminating causation furthers tort
law’s corrective justice rationale that liability is linked to moral responsibility.”).
95
Schroeder, supra note 93, at 361; see also, Christopher H. Schroeder,
Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. REV. 143 (1990).
“[C]orrective justice does not require liabilities in tort to be based on cause-in-fact.” Id.
at 144. Schroeder advocates a conception of corrective justice that holds “actors . . .
liable for the risks they create,” rather than the risks they create that result in harm.
Id. Indeed, Schroeder advocates a “liability-for-risk system” rather than “harm-caused
system.” Id.
96
See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of Tort Law, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2010), http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/tort-theories/#CorJus (“For a loss to be wrongful in the relevant
sense, it need not be one for which the wrongdoer is morally to blame.”). Schroeder
maintains that his is a theory of corrective justice because corrective justice “is itself a
contested concept, loose enough to invite continual debate . . . and comprehended
enough to produce some shared agreement.” Schroeder, supra note 95, at 146.
97
Schroeder, supra note 93, at 360.
98
Schroeder, supra note 95, at 147 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). For
Schroeder, who grounds his theory of corrective justice in Kantian moral philosophy, the
noninstrumental requirement flows from the central tenet of Kantian moral philosophy,
which is to “[a]ct in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or
in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a
means to an end.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30
(James W. Ellington trans., Hackett 3d ed. 1993) (1785); see also Ernest J. Weinrib,
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621, 633 (2002) (“So far as private
law is concerned, Kant traces the conceptual development of right from the notion that
one is not to allow oneself to be a mere means for others . . . .”). Any instrumentalist
justification for the theory would then undercut its Kantian foundations.
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earlier and better information . . . about potential problems.”99
Hence, corrective justice provides no justificatory cover for
Berger’s causation-free theory of torts. Accordingly, Berger’s
theory must be evaluated on instrumental grounds; that is, the
value of her theory depends entirely on the consequences of its
implementation. We turn to those next.
2. The Unforeseen and Undesirable Consequences of
Berger’s Theory
Professor Berger’s theory promises to make defendants
behave differently by increasing the costs for any risky
behavior and vindicating plaintiffs who would otherwise lose
due to scientific uncertainty. It is a safe bet that both of these
aims will be fulfilled under her theory. In this sense, her theory
might be said to give rise to consequences that might be viewed
as beneficial. But there are a whole host of additional
consequences to consider—particularly aggregate costs—that
Professor Berger does not address.
Consider the problem of setting highway speed limits:
speeding-related traffic deaths would certainly be reduced if
visually and emotionally arresting accidents were used as the
basis for lowering highway speed limits by forty miles per
hour.100 But such a solution entails many other human costs.101
The cost of goods would increase as commerce slowed, the
economy would suffer as people spent otherwise productive
time in transit. People might very well quit using highways for
their high speed driving, instead choosing to drive faster in
residential areas and other areas less suited for high speed
driving, in turn causing even more fatal accidents and perhaps
even raising the costs of traffic enforcement. By seeking to
prevent all accidents, we may indirectly cause many more. All
costs must be considered when writing regulations that effect
human safety.
In appraising these costs, we begin with a previously
unnoticed but significant consequence of Berger’s theory. By
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, Berger’s theory
99

Berger, supra note 82, at 2141.
Though it may be difficult to admit, we tacitly agree to sacrifice thousands of
human lives a year in exchange for the benefits that flow from current highway speeds.
101
For general discussions of the unavoidable tradeoffs of governing, see
Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 65, 73
(2008); Ronald J. Allen & Amy Shavell, Further Reflections on the Guillotine, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 628 (2005).
100
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eliminates plaintiffs’ lawyers’ gatekeeper function, thereby
altering the litigation calculus. Plaintiffs’ lawyers (and often
their expert witnesses) play a gatekeeper function of their own,
weighing the costs of litigation against the potential
contingency fee discounted by the probability of success. It has
been argued that Daubert drove the costs of litigation up for
plaintiffs, thereby dissuading some plaintiffs from litigating,
and it is certainly true that the cost of litigation affects
plaintiffs’ incentive to bring suit and defendants’ incentive to
settle. Berger’s proposed theory of liability will drive the costs
of litigation down for plaintiffs, and it will make the costs for
defendants disproportionately higher. Placing the burden of
causation on the defendants concomitantly removes the burden
of proving causation from the plaintiffs. As the plaintiffs’ costs
go down and defendants’ costs go up, litigation is likely to
increase as the incentives to settle increase.102 In essence, the
burden of proving the absence of causation will fall on
defendants to show that every possible claim that plaintiffs
might make is false, rather than requiring plaintiffs now to
provide justification for their claims. However, the difficulty of
proving a negative is legendary. All a plaintiff must do is allege
some as yet unresolved state of affairs that has not been
studied and claim illness as a result of, say, a defendant’s drug.
For example, a plaintiff who has taken a variety of drugs, has a
rare precondition, and has developed a rare illness could
require every single manufacturer of every drug the plaintiff
has ever taken to demonstrate lack of causation. In short, the
most predictable and troubling consequence of Berger’s theory
is that meritless litigation and settlements will proliferate,
generating costs which consumers will ultimately be forced to
bear. Higher litigation and settlement costs for manufacturers
102

The larger the potential pool of plaintiffs suffering from a given injury, the
greater a defendant’s incentives to litigate, because the costs of causation studies will
be outweighed by the potential liability to the pool of plaintiffs. Conversely, smaller
pools of plaintiffs will decrease defendants’ incentives to litigate, since the costs of
disproving causation will be more likely to outweigh the costs of settling. Thus, so long
as the plaintiff crafts an appropriately narrow claim—say, that the defendant
negligently failed to research drug X’s interaction with drug Y and rare
precondition Z—the plaintiff can ensure that the defendants incentive to litigate will
approach zero. A predictable result of Berger’s theory is that defendants will be
overwhelmed by a torrent of unusual law suits of this sort. They will settle these suits
because litigation will be exponentially more expensive. There will be many, many
undeserving plaintiffs who recover under this theory, because economic efficiency
demands that defendant corporations settle rather than defend in cases where the cost
of disproving causation is in the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars and the
plaintiff is alleging a relatively unique injury.
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will translate into higher drug prices for consumers as well as
fewer drugs being brought to market.103
B.

Professors Berger and Twerski’s Causation-Free Theory

Professor Berger recently collaborated with Professor
Aaron Twerski to revise her tort theory. Together, they argue
that courts ought to recognize an informed choice cause of
action that would allow plaintiffs claiming injury from
pharmaceutical products to recover damages for deprivation of
informed choice when the indicia of a “troubling” and
“recurring pattern of drug cases” arises:
(1) the causal relationship between the toxic agent and plaintiff’s
harm is unresolved at the time of litigation . . . ; (2) the drug is not
therapeutic but rather its purpose is to avoid discomfort or to
improve lifestyle; (3) it is almost certain that a patient made aware
of the risk that is alleged to be associated with consumption of the
drug would have refused to take it; and (4) the defendant drug
company was aware of the potential risk or should have undertaken
reasonable testing to discover the risk and failed to provide the
requisite information to the physician or patient.104

This theory is interesting and remarkable in its own right.
Professor David Bernstein critiqued Professors Berger
and Twerski’s theory and they responded,105 and we do not
recreate those arguments here. Rather, we raise concerns of
our own. First, we again address the odd philosophical or
theoretical aspects of the theory, which differ from those posed
by Professor Berger’s alternative vision of tort liability. Next,
we explain how the cause of action they propose will overdeter
or underdeter due to its failure to account for base incidence
103

See, for example, the state of affairs in the pre-Daubert Ferebee era, when
manufacturers rolled back research and development of new drugs and vaccines out of
fear of litigation in which even unreliable evidence was admissible. Bernstein, supra note
17, at 467-68. “Ferebee implicitly condoned treating plaintiffs’ experts in toxic tort cases
as if their status as qualified experts meant that their reasoning and conclusions
necessarily reflected the views of a reputable segment of their scientific peers.” Id. at 46566. And those drugs that do come to market will be covered in warnings—so many, in
fact, that they may begin to lose meaning. This article’s authors did an informal survey
and found that the FDA’s most severe warning, so-called “Black Box” warnings, attach to
drugs for treating acne, depression, menopause, and anxiety. Drugs with Black Box
Warnings by Therapeutic Class, BLACKBOXRX, http://www.formularyproductions.com/
master/showpage.php?dir=blackbox&whichpage=237 (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
104
Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed
Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 259 (2005).
105
See id.; Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Correspondence, From
the Wrong End of the Telescope: A Response to Professor David Bernstein, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1983 (2006); Bernstein, supra note 74.
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rates. Finally, we draw on work in moral psychology to explain
why juror damage awards will likely approximate full
compensatory damages instead of the partial damage awards
that are integral to the theory.
1. Theoretical Problems: Proximate Cause Without

Cause-in-Fact
Professors Berger and Twerski’s theory abandons tort
law’s causation-in-fact requirement because of the difficulties
of proving causation in toxic tort cases. The only question is
whether the defendant’s breach—here, a failure to disclose
some risk—was a foreseeable cause of the plaintiff’s injury.
Note that the plaintiff must have suffered an injury, but is not
required to prove that the defendant’s risky conduct caused the
injury. The defendant need only have failed to disclose some
risk—however small—to the plaintiff and the plaintiff must
have suffered the type of injury within the scope of the risk not
disclosed. The mechanics of Berger and Twerski’s tort reduces
to one question: did the defendant breach a duty to the injured
plaintiff?106 It is of course possible to attach liability to breaches
of duty, and this is quite common in criminal law. But it is not
a feature of the tort system.
It is tempting, and certainly less confusing, to say that
Berger and Twerski’s theory simply attaches liability to a
breach of duty, but that is not quite the case. The theory
requires that a plaintiff have suffered some injury, but people
frequently breach their duties without causing injury. The
proposal thus has a conceptual muddle at its center: it
randomly assigns liability based on a breach of duty, regardless
of whether the breach of duty actually caused the harm. And of
course, the “breach of duty” is entirely hypothetical, precisely
because one does not know that in fact the harm was actually
caused by the defendant.
2. Practical Problems: Unforeseen Consequences

We turn now to the potential consequences of their
theory. Because plaintiffs under this theory are entitled to
damages that will only be a portion of compensatory damages,
106

On this point, see Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective
Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214, 220-21
(Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
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disciplining the defendants under Berger and Twerski’s theory
will be a function of the number rather than the magnitude of
lawsuits. For example, in the case of drugs and disease, the
number of lawsuits will turn on baseline rates of the disease
(as it would if Berger and Twerski’s theory had been applied to
Bendectin cases, which we now know to be nonteratogenic and
not the cause of the injuries) rather than the real incidence of
injury. This problem is most clearly understood through an
example.
Consider the recent concerns over potential linkages
between cell phones and brain cancer.107 Cell phones are not
necessary for the preservation of life; they simply increase the
quality of life. Under Berger and Twerski’s theory, if it turns
out that cell phone manufacturers did not warn of radiation
risks that a reasonable person would want to know about,
every person in the United States who uses a cell phone and is
afflicted with brain cancer would have a cause of action against
the manufacturer of his or her cell phone, regardless of the
source of the injury. In other words, plaintiffs would have a
cause of action regardless of the baseline cancer rates. Even if
brain cancer rates had remained consistent for a century or
more, thereby providing strong evidence that cell phones do not
cause brain cancer, every injured person would have a cause of
action against the manufacturer. Even in the unlikely event
that damage awards are small in these cases, the number of
cases (there are roughly 22,000 new cases of brain cancer a
year)108 would impose large costs on the manufacturer. But
given the baseline, it would also very likely result in a windfall
for many, if not all, of the 22,000 plaintiffs.109 While those cell
phone users who also suffered loss of informed choice—the
injury for which plaintiffs recover damages under this theory—
without developing cancer receive nothing, those developing
cancer, whatever the cause, receive damages.
By providing recovery for unsubstantiated risks, Berger
and Twerski almost certainly guarantee a regime in which
doctors and pharmaceutical manufacturers provide too many
warnings, which will have the dual effect of not only
diminishing the force of warnings that reflect a truly serious
107

A Lexis-Nexis search for news articles with the words “cellular phones”
and “cancer” pulls more than 3000 articles.
108
Brain Tumor Home Page, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/
cancertopics/types/brain (last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
109
See id.
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risk, but also deterring people from taking medications that
they should take.110 If drugs like Bendectin should have come
with warnings, as Berger and Twerski argue, then many other
safe drugs will be covered in unnecessary warnings, thus
diminishing the value of all warnings. A patient will have two
choices: numb herself to the warnings that cover every pill
bottle, or refuse treatment with medications that are necessary
for her, or her fetus’, wellbeing. These outcomes could very well
be worse than the status quo, but in any event they plainly
need to be accounted for in proposals like Berger and Twerski’s.
Finally, as with Professor Berger’s original theory, the
proposed cause of action would likely lead to increased
litigation with the predictable effect of driving even some safe
drugs off the market:
While successful informed choice actions would individually be less
remunerative for plaintiffs than successful causation actions would
be, it would be much easier for plaintiffs to meet the burden of proof
and persuade judges and juries to rule in their favor. Pharmaceutical
companies would therefore likely face far more lawsuits for lack of
informed choice than they ever faced for causation. Under such
circumstances, “who in his right mind . . . would work on a product
that would be used by pregnant women?”111
....
The jury is then supposed to ignore the causation and damages
evidence they just heard and dispassionately decide whether the
evidence of “risk” presented by the plaintiff’s experts warrants
granting the plaintiff emotional distress damages based on lack of
informed choice, knowing that if they rule for the defendants on this
issue, the plaintiff will receive no compensation.112

A growing body of work in psychology suggests that the
sort of mental restraints that Berger and Twerski’s work
requires of jurors may simply not be available to them.113

110

Omission bias occurs when a more harmful act of omission is preferred to a
less harmful act of commission. The Psychology of Patient Decision Making, supra note
50. One rather extreme example of omission bias is choosing to forego a polio vaccine
during a polio outbreak because there is a one in a million chance of contracting polio
from the vaccine itself.
111
Bernstein, supra note 105, at 1978 (footnotes omitted).
112
Id. at 1975.
113
See generally Joshua Green & John Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral
Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517 (2002). One of the key ideas is
“automaticity”—i.e., “the mind’s ability to solve many problems, including high-level
social ones, unconsciously and automatically.” Id. at 517.
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3. Juror Confusion: A Moral-Psychological Perspective

Berger and Twerski’s theory raises a serious question
about jury decision making: when jurors are faced with a
plaintiff suffering from some severe and tragic injury, and a
defendant, often a corporate defendant, is shown to have failed
to disclose some uncertain risk of causing the injury, it is quite
possible that a juror’s natural instinct will be to fill the
causation gap and punish the defendant in order to make the
plaintiff whole. In this section, we draw on work in the field of
moral psychology and the burgeoning field of experimental
philosophy to demonstrate the seriousness of this risk. In the
field of psychology, we focus on Mark Alicke’s Culpable Control
Model of Blame Attribution (“CCM”), which provides empirical
evidence of the potential of Berger and Twerski’s theory to
adversely affect jury decision making.114 We also discuss Joshua
Knobe’s work with Ben Fraser on causation and ascriptions of
blame which also supports the proposition that, all other things
being equal, an actor who violates a moral norm is more likely
to be viewed as responsible for a bad state of affairs than an
actor whose conduct does not violate a moral norm.115 The
danger of Berger and Twerski’s theory is that it invites such
misattributions of causation.
Alicke’s CCM provides a descriptive account of how
blame attributions are made in ordinary circumstances and
purports to show “the conditions that increase as well as
mitigate blame and analyzes the process by which blame and
mitigation decisions are made.”116 Alicke’s work in the
psychology of blame indicates that spontaneous evaluations of
the bad outcome (here the injury to the plaintiff), will directly
affect blame ascriptions, which jurors will then buttress by
altering their causal control assessments.117 When jurors’ blame
ascription mode is turned on by evidence of corporate
misfeasance or malfeasance, they tend “to over ascribe control
to human agency and to confirm unfavorable expectations,”118
114

See generally Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of
Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556 (2000).
115
See Joshua Knobe & Ben Fraser, Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment: Two
Experiments, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 441, 442 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008).
116
Alicke, supra note 114, at 557.
117
Id. at 565 (“[S]pontaneous evaluations of the outcome directly affected
blame ascriptions, which participants then buttressed by altering their causal control
assessments.”).
118
Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
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leading persons to “exaggerate evidence that establishe[d] [an
actor’s] causal or volitional control and de-emphasize
exculpatory evidence.”119
In the context of Berger and Twerski’s theory, this could
easily translate to confirming causation where none exists. To
see how this works, consider the following study:
Participants learned that the driver was speeding either to hide an
anniversary present or a vial of cocaine. Moreover, they learned that
the driver encountered a number of environmental obstacles—
slippery road, poor visibility, etc. Participants were then asked to
say whether the driver’s speeding or the environmental factors
played a greater role in causing the accident. The results showed
that participants were more inclined to attribute the accident to the
driver rather than the environmental conditions when the driver
was hiding the cocaine than they were when he was hiding an
anniversary gift.120

The example above may map directly onto jury decision
making, suggesting that jurors may be more inclined to
attribute the accident to defendants when the defendants
performed some antecedently immoral act. Under Berger and
Twerski’s theory, plaintiffs whose cases would have been
dismissed on summary judgment for lack of evidence of
causation will now have an opportunity to bring an action.
Once in court, plaintiffs’ lawyers will argue that the defendants
immorally failed to warn of a risk. Alicke’s work suggests that
“cognitive shortcomings and motivational biases are endemic to
blame,”121 which means that actions under Berger and Twerski’s
theory may likely lead to gross overcompensation, a factor that
Berger and Twerski did not consider. At a minimum, before
substantial change to the tort system can be adopted, such
concerns need to be accommodated.
Recent experiments conducted by Joshua Knobe and
Ben Fraser indicate that moral judgments can directly impact
causal judgments.122 As they acknowledge, “[i]t has long been
known that people’s causal judgments can have an impact on
their moral judgments.”123 For instance, the knowledge that
someone caused the death of another may lead to the
119

Id. at 566.
Thomas Nadelhoffer, Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional
Actions: Some Problems for Juror Impartiality, 9 PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS 203,
207-08 (2006).
121
Alicke, supra note 114, at 557.
122
Knobe & Fraser, supra note 115, at 441.
123
Id.
120
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conclusion that the behavior was morally wrong. Knobe and
Fraser proffer evidence supporting the opposite conclusion:
negative moral judgments can lead to attributions of causation.
Knobe and Fraser analyze a hypothetical posed by Julia
Driver:
Lauren and Jane work for the same company. They each need to use
a computer for work sometimes. Unfortunately, the computer isn’t
very powerful. If two people are logged on at the same time, it
usually crashes. So the company decided to institute an official
policy. It declared that Lauren would be the only one permitted to
use the computer in the mornings and that Jane would be the only
one permitted to use the computer in the afternoons. As expected,
Lauren logged on the computer the next day at 9:00 am. But Jane
decided to disobey the official policy. She also logged on at 9:00 am.
The computer crashed immediately.124

When presented with this case, in which both persons were the
but-for cause, but only one, Jane, breached a duty, people
frequently respond that Jane caused the crash, not Lauren,
despite the fact that Jane’s behavior almost perfectly resembles
Lauren’s. The major difference, the authors argue, is
normative: Jane’s violation of her obligations influences
participants’ causal judgments.125
The problem with Knobe and Fraser’s study, however, is
that it highlights, but does not clarify, the complexity of the
legal concept of causation. In the example above, both Jane and
Lauren are but-for causes of the computer crash, but only Jane
was the proximate cause of the computer crash.126 Participants
in Knobe and Fraser’s study may have been intending to
express this notion when they ascribed causation to Jane. If
true, Knobe and Fraser’s study highlights the common critique
124

Id. at 442 (quoting Julia Driver, Attributions of Causation and Moral
Responsibility, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 115, at 413, 428).
125
Id. There is a debate about whether the attributions of causation are due
to the immorality of Jane’s antecedent acts or merely due to the atypicality of that act.
Knobe and Fraser highlight Julia Driver’s argument on atypicality:
Jane’s behavior seems quite atypical for a person in her position, whereas
Lauren’s behavior seems perfectly common and ordinary. So perhaps people’s
tendency to pick out Jane’s behavior and classify it as a cause has nothing to
do with its distinctive moral status. It might be that people simply classify
Jane’s behavior as a cause because they regard it as atypical.
Id.; see also Julia Driver, Kinds of Norms and Legal Causation: Reply to Knobe and
Fraser and Deigh, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 115, at 459.
126
Jane’s use of the computer was the legal or proximate cause of the crash, in
the sense that it involved an “unreasonable risk of: (1) causing harm to a class of
persons of which the other is a member and (2) subjecting the other to the hazard from
which the harm results.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965).
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of experimental philosophy: that opinion polling is often too
blunt an instrument to tease out the concepts being studied.127
Nonetheless, Knobe and Fraser’s findings do make the
intuitively obvious point that jurors may be more likely to
attribute causation to defendants who have performed some
act—like failing to disclose a risk, however small—that makes
the subsequent injury more foreseeable. And this is precisely
what Berger and Twerski’s theory sets jurors up to do. In a
typical case, a corporation will be shown to have not disclosed
some risk with regard to a substance; a plaintiff that has
ingested that substance and subsequently developed some
tragic illness. Under Berger and Twerski’s theory, the jury is
supposed to coolly and rationally put the question of causation
out of their minds and simply punish the defendants for their
failure to warn the plaintiffs. A more likely result, supported
by Knobe and Fraser’s research, is that jurors will attribute
causation in situations like these—either explicitly, in the form
of a judgment, or tacitly, in the form of larger damage awards
for violation of the failure to warn tort.
IV.

SKAPP’S STUDY OF DAUBERT IN THE DELAWARE
COURTS: IS THERE A PROBLEM?

The concerns about Daubert and the resultant solutions
all turn on assumptions about the effects of Daubert. SKAPP
funded a study by the National Center for State Courts to
gauge these effects in Delaware courts.128 That study found that
the effects of Daubert have been minimal.129 As SKAPP’s own
127

For further critiques of experimental philosophy, see Antti Kauppinen, The
Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy, 10 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 95 (2007);
S. Matthew Liao, A Defense of Intuitions, 140 PHIL. STUD. 247 (2007); Kirk Ludwig, The
Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First versus Third Person Approaches, 31
MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 128 (2007); Ernest Sosa, Experimental Philosophy and
Philosophical Intuition, 132 PHIL. STUD. 99 (2006).
128
WATERS & HODGE, supra note 79, at 2. Delaware is among a number of
states that have adopted Daubert at the state court level. Id. at 5.
129
Id. at 21. Waters and Hodge concluded:
The overall impact of Daubert has been minimal compared to what was
originally feared when the decision came down from the U.S. Supreme Court.
Delaware Superior Court was not affected by excessive or unnecessary cost or
delay as a result of Daubert. Although Daubert has created additional
barriers to civil plaintiffs’ ability to bring their case to trial, the impact has
been isolated to a small number, albeit important and complex, cases. As
confirmed in other work in this area, challenges to expert witness testimony
are not a frequent occurrence in either civil or criminal cases in the Delaware
Superior Court. The practice of holding Daubert hearings is even less
frequent. Daubert motions appeared most frequently in mature cases ready
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study would seem to be credible evidence to judge its positions,
we discuss it briefly below.130
Prior to SKAPP’s study, many of the extant studies of
the effects of the Daubert trilogy relied on content analysis of
appellate opinions.131 Because studies of appellate opinions are
subject to selection bias, the authors of the SKAPP-funded
study set out to directly explore whether and to what extent
the Daubert trilogy has affected the ways courts handle expert
witness testimony. The authors researched products liability
and criminal cases in Delaware pre-Daubert from the years
1989-1993 and post-Daubert from the years 1999-2004.132 The
authors surveyed all 126 product liability cases during that
time period as well as 1950 cases of felony rape and murder.133
Additionally, they conducted interviews with judges and
lawyers about Daubert’s effect on the case.134 The authors found
only twenty cases in which a litigant moved to exclude expert
witness testimony.135 Ten of the cases were pre-Daubert and ten
were post-Daubert.136 Of the twenty disputes many revolved
around “duo-experts,” involving, for example, a bio-engineering
expert to explain the causal mechanism of an injury and a
medical expert to explain the injury itself.137 Usually, the
motions were to ensure that the expert testifying about
causation did not testify about injury and the expert testifying
about injury did not testify about causation.138

for trial, and judges typically rendered a ruling on the expert’s deposition and
attorneys’ briefs. Daubert hearings were reserved for complex civil cases and
occasionally entertained during a criminal trial.
Id.
130

Note that the small numbers impair its generalizability, but there should
be no question about bias.
131
See Henry F. Fradella, Lauren O’Neill & Adam Fogarty, The Impact of
Daubert on Forensic Science, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 323 (2004); Jennifer L. Groscup et al.,
The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal
Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 344 (2002); D. Michael Risinger,
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000); Rob Robinson, Does CSI Lie? The New
Institutionalism and the Treatment of Forensic Evidence by Federal Courts under
Daubert, (Apr. 7, 2005) (paper presented at the meeting of The Midwest Political
Science Association).
132
WATERS & HODGE, supra note 79, at 8, 10.
133
Id. at 10.
134
Id. at 2.
135
Id. at 15.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
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The authors’ findings and conclusion disconfirm
SKAPP’s prediction that Daubert portends disaster for
plaintiffs. The authors found that motions in limine were
treated roughly the same before and after Daubert,139 but that
post-Daubert, the disposition less often resulted in a jury or
bench trial.140 And when the motions were granted, a partial
exclusion of the testimony or a limiting of the scope of
admissible testimony resulted more frequently than a complete
exclusion of an expert.141 They found “no differences between
the pre-Daubert and post-Daubert cases in the number of
summary judgments entered.”142 The courts were not overrun by
cost or delay, due in no small part to judges’ ability to handle
the new challenges.143 Overall, Daubert hearings were found to
be isolated to a small number of important and complex cases.144
Expert testimony was challenged in only sixteen percent of
product liability cases and eight percent of felony murder and
rape cases.145 The study concluded that “[t]he overall impact of
Daubert has been minimal compared to what was originally
feared when the decision came down from the U.S. Supreme
Court.”146
SKAPP argues elsewhere that Daubert has chilled
plaintiffs from bringing suits.147 Evidence supporting this
proposition is said to be in the results of a 2002 RAND
Institute study, which “found that after an initial spike in the
number of challenges to expert testimony, the incidence began
to fall off dramatically.”148 From this SKAPP concludes that the
fall in challenges occurred because “plaintiffs increasingly
decided not to bring actions that relied heavily upon scientific
testimony unless that testimony met the Daubert standards.”149
However, the decrease in the number of Daubert challenges
might just as well be due to the fact that defendants choose not
to pursue Daubert challenges or because the system quickly
settled back into something approximating its previous status
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
SKAPP, DAUBERT, supra note 16, at 12-13.
Id. at 12.
Id.
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quo. Interestingly, SKAPP’s Delaware study confirms this
point. Although the evidence gathered from Delaware suggests
that SKAPP’s critiques may miss the mark, obviously much
more empirical work is necessary to fully assess the effects of
the Daubert trilogy in state courts.150
V.

CONCLUSION

We end where we began. Daubert has not been an
unmitigated success, but the recent criticisms of it, whatever
their motivation, seem more likely to achieve an unjustified
redistribution of wealth with predictable negative social
consequences. We understand the impulse that yearns to
provide the unfortunate person solace, but we do not
understand the failure to contextualize the consequences of
redistribution schemes, many of which may make more persons
worse rather than better off.
The SKAPP study discussed in Part IV suggests that
critics of Daubert are focusing on the wrong implications of the
precedent in formulating their criticisms and alternate
theories. For example, Berger and Twerski assume that
Daubert will result in fewer plaintiffs being able to bring
successful toxic tort claims. However, the real problem with
Daubert—the problem that Berger and Twerski do not
address—is epistemological in nature, and concerns the
conditions that permit rational deliberation about expert
testimony. This problem raises serious questions about the
dangers of leaving fact finders to choose among experts based
on credentials, demeanor, or epistemically arbitrary criteria.
150

See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING
EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION xiii (2001) (“It
appears that judges are indeed doing what they were directed to do by the Supreme Court:
they are increasingly acting as gatekeepers for reliability and relevance, they are examining
the methods and reasoning underlying the evidence, and they appear to be employing
general acceptance as only one of many factors that enter their reliability assessments.”); see
also Richard J. Arsenault & John Randall Whaley, Will Daubert Challenge Your Class
Certification?, TRIAL, July 2009, at 38, 39 (“Courts have wrestled with what admissibility
standard to apply at the class certification stage when parties offer expert testimony.”);
Fradella, O’Neill & Fogarty, supra note 131; Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Revisited, 41 CRIM.
L. BULL. 302 (2005) (noting that “federal courts demand stringent epidemiological studies in
toxic tort cases and then accept such vacuous reasoning in criminal cases”); Jeremy
Buchman, The Legal Model and Daubert’s Effect on Trial Judges’ Decisions to Admit
Scientific Expert Testimony (Apr. 15-18, 2004) (paper presented at the Midwest Political
Science Association Annual meeting), http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_
research_citation/0/8/3/3/9/pages83392/p83392-1.php (using quantitative analysis to find “no
evidence that the outcomes of admissibility rulings are affected either by the Supreme
Court’s holding in Daubert or the prospect of reversal by a superior court.”).
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The solution is not relaxing the overall standard for expert
testimony, nor is it creating new theories of liability based on a
hodgepodge of otherwise inadmissible evidence, particularly if
those theories will lead to excessive and unnecessary warnings.
Substantive justice in the context of expert testimony will be
the result of procedures that lead to the truth.
The real problem with Daubert cannot be corrected by a
formal test or by the redistribution programs discussed above.
The real problem that Daubert highlights is how incompatible
the use of incomprehensible scientific or technical evidence is
with basic notions of justice. The solution is not more injustice
that happens to be more equally distributed, or more injustice
in the name of helping the unfortunate. The solution is to deal
with the problem—the informational vulnerability of the law.
Daubert should be extended rather than cut back. All evidence,
not just lay evidence, should truly be tested by relevance and
reliability. Ironically, the Daubert court inadequately
appreciated the relevance component rather than inadequately
treated the reliability component, which is the standard
critique of the case. Evidence cannot be relevant unless it can
be understood. Daubert requires the trial judge to understand
the evidence, but does not require the trial judge to require the
jury to understand it. That is the deep flaw in Daubert and the
flaw that should be corrected by rejecting the deferential model
of decision making it encourages.

